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A reverse-payment agreement, also known as a “pay-for-delay” 
agreement, is a type of patent settlement in which a brand-name 
drug manufacturer pays a prospective generic manufacturer not 
to challenge the brand-name manufacturer’s patent. These settle-
ments are relatively common,1 but they are also controversial be-
cause they can enable the brand-name manufacturer to maintain 
monopoly power over an invalid patent, which leaves consumers 
paying too-high prices for too-small quantities of the drug. In the 
2013 case FTC v Actavis, Inc,2 the Supreme Court held that these 
settlements are subject to antitrust scrutiny because of their po-
tential to artificially extend the monopoly power conferred by a 
patent.3 This Comment explores whether and how federal settle-
ment privilege—which, in several jurisdictions, shields from dis-
covery in future lawsuits any communications that parties make 
in the course of reaching a settlement—applies in antitrust liti-
gation concerning reverse-payment agreements. 
Because Actavis held that the anticompetitive harm of re-
verse payments stems from the settling parties’ attempts “to pre-
vent the risk of competition,”4 courts hearing reverse-payment 
cases must examine parties’ reasons for settling to determine lia-
bility: “If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to share 
patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some 
 
 † BA 2013, Creighton University; JD Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago 
Law School. 
 1 In fiscal year 2014 (the most recent year for which data is available), American 
pharmaceutical companies entered into twenty-one reverse-payment settlements, which 
accounted for 13 percent of all patent settlements between brand-name and generic man-
ufacturers. The combined value of these settlements exceeded $6 billion. See Agreements 
Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improve-
ment, and Modernization Act of 2003: Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2014; A Report 
by the Bureau of Competition *1, 4, archived at http://perma.cc/BP8K-AB3N. 
 2 133 S Ct 2223 (2013). 
 3 Id at 2227. 
 4 Id at 2236. 
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other justification, the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the ar-
rangement.”5 But if settlement is motivated by “traditional [ ] con-
siderations,” such as a desire to avoid litigation costs or to com-
pensate the generic manufacturer for services that it has agreed 
to perform, the settlement will not be found anticompetitive.6 
Now that courts presiding over reverse-payment cases must 
consider the motivations of the manufacturers who entered the 
settlement agreement, it is crucial to know whether and to what 
extent communications made in furtherance of reverse-payment 
settlements are protected by settlement privilege. This Comment 
proposes an answer to that question. 
Part I of this Comment explains the origins of reverse pay-
ments and why these agreements are uniquely attractive to drug 
manufacturers. It concludes by discussing the Actavis opinion and 
the current legal status of reverse-payment agreements, paying 
special attention to the implications that Actavis has for those 
courts that recognize settlement privilege. Part II explains what 
settlement privilege is and why some federal courts—but not oth-
ers—have decided to recognize the privilege. Part III examines 
the evidentiary dilemma faced by courts that must scrutinize re-
verse payments under the constraints of settlement privilege. 
Most importantly, Part III suggests two ways in which courts that 
recognize settlement privilege can reconcile that privilege with 
the mandate of Actavis. Part III.A explores how the crime-fraud 
doctrine, according to which no privilege attaches to communica-
tions undertaken in furtherance of crime or fraud, could provide 
a work-around to settlement privilege in many reverse-payment 
cases, but also describes the difficulties inherent in such an ap-
proach. Part III.B then offers an alternative solution: instead of 
relying on the complex, obstacle-laden crime-fraud doctrine, 
courts can invoke the common-law “necessity exception” to con-
fine settlement privilege so that it does not apply in lawsuits, such 
as reverse-payment suits, in which the legality of the settlement 
itself is at issue. Careful application of either the crime-fraud doc-
trine or, more promisingly, the necessity exception would allow 
courts to adjudicate reverse-payment cases without abandoning 
settlement privilege altogether. 
 
 5 Id at 2237. 
 6 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236. 
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I.  REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND ACTAVIS 
A reverse-payment agreement—also called a “pay-for-delay” 
agreement—is a type of patent settlement in which a patent 
holder pays a prospective rival to settle patent challenges.7 From 
their inception, the legal status of these agreements has been con-
troversial. By giving patent holders the power to stifle challenges 
to their monopoly power, reverse payments strain the tension be-
tween patent law, which grants innovators monopoly rights over 
their creations, and antitrust law, which seeks to eradicate mo-
nopolies and similar restraints on trade.8 
This Part explores this tension and its legal implications. 
Part I.A provides an overview of the regulatory framework that 
has made reverse-payment agreements uniquely popular in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Part I.B discusses the legal controversy 
surrounding these agreements, eventually turning to the Supreme 
Court’s resolution of that controversy in Actavis. Finally, Part I.C 
outlines some important questions that remain unanswered in the 
wake of Actavis. These questions directly bear on whether and to 
what extent communications made in furtherance of reverse-
payment settlements are protected by settlement privilege. 
A. Background and Regulatory Framework 
For reasons discussed in this Section, reverse-payment 
agreements are especially—if not uniquely9—attractive to phar-
maceutical manufacturers. Pharmaceutical drugs are one of the 
many types of “composition[s] of matter” eligible for protection 
under US patent law.10 The creator of a drug whose patent is ap-
proved by the US Patent and Trademark Office receives the ex-
clusive right to manufacture and sell that drug for a twenty-year 
term.11 This monopoly term is widely considered to be a necessary 
incentive for drug manufacturers: without some period of exclu-
sivity during which the manufacturer can charge above-market 
 
 7 Einer Elhauge and Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 Tex L 
Rev 283, 284 & n 1 (2012). 
 8 For a discussion of this tension and its implications, see generally E. Thomas 
Sullivan, The Confluence of Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the New Century, 1 
Minn Intel Prop Rev 1 (2000). 
 9 See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2227 (“Apparently most if not all reverse payment settle-
ment agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation.”). 
 10 35 USC § 101. See also Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle 
Management after KSR v. Teleflex, 63 Food & Drug L J 275, 289 (2008) (noting that drug 
patents are often filed as compositions of matter). 
 11 35 USC §§ 154(a)(2), 271(a). 
GOWEN_CMT_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016  2:10 PM 
1508  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1505 
   
prices and reap monopoly profits, many drug manufacturers 
would not be able to recover their research and development 
costs.12 
In addition to obtaining a patent for its new drug, the manu-
facturer must obtain approval from the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) in order to legally market that drug.13 The Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,14 
commonly known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act,”15 outlines the pro-
cess by which pharmaceutical companies gain FDA approval to 
bring a drug to market.16 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also prescribes procedures designed 
to resolve patent disputes between brand-name and generic drug 
manufacturers. A manufacturer seeking to market a new drug 
must submit a New Drug Application17 (NDA) providing details 
about the drug’s composition and “full reports of investigations 
which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe 
for use and whether such drug is effective in use.”18 This clinical 
testing and approval process is long, arduous, and extremely ex-
pensive.19 The manufacturer also provides “the patent number 
and the expiration date of any patent” that a generic manufac-
turer would infringe by manufacturing the drug.20 The upshot of 
this process for the applicant is that, if the FDA approves the 
NDA, it publishes the drug and patent information in a book 
called “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations,”21 nicknamed the “Orange Book.”22 
 
 12 See Wendy H. Schacht and John R. Thomas, Patent Law and Its Application to the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Examination of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (“The Hatch-Waxman Act”) *2–5 (Congressional Research Service, 
Jan 10, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/E3SR-KPW9. 
 13 See 21 USC § 355(a). 
 14 Pub L No 98-417, 98 Stat 1585. 
 15 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2228. 
 16 See 21 USC § 355(b), (j). 
 17 See 21 CFR § 314.50. 
 18 21 USC § 355(b)(1). 
 19 See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, and Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of 
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J Health Econ 151, 161–66 
(2003) (estimating that the costs of NDA clinical testing constitute half the cost of drug 
development and that the average successful drug costs $282 million to develop). 
 20 21 USC § 355(b)(1). 
 21 See 21 USC § 355(j)(7)(A). 
 22 See Julie Dohm, Comment, Expanding the Scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s Pa-
tent Carve-Out Exception to the Identical Drug Labeling Requirement: Closing the Patent 
Litigation Loophole, 156 U Pa L Rev 151, 152 n 2 (2007) (describing the Orange Book). 
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A quicker and simpler method of approval is available to pro-
spective generic manufacturers of drugs listed in the Orange 
Book. A generic drug manufacturer need file only an Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA),23 which incorporates the safety 
and effectiveness findings of the previously approved brand-name 
drug. This method allows the generic manufacturer “to piggyback 
on” the research and testing of the original manufacturer and 
thereby gain FDA approval so long as it can prove that the generic 
drug is chemically identical to the original.24 
However, the ANDA applicant must certify to the FDA that 
its generic drug will not infringe the original manufacturer’s pa-
tent. There are several ways in which an ANDA applicant can 
make this certification. Commonly, the applicant will certify that 
the original patent has expired or will expire before the generic 
goes to market.25 Alternatively, the applicant can assert that the 
original manufacturer’s “patent is invalid or will not be infringed 
by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the 
application is submitted.”26 This latter filing is called a “[P]ara-
graph IV certification.”27 
If the generic applicant files a Paragraph IV certification, it 
must notify the patent holder that it is challenging the validity of 
the patent.28 The notification must “include a detailed statement 
of the factual and legal basis” for the generic’s belief that the pa-
tent is invalid.29 The patent holder then has forty-five days to sue 
the ANDA applicant for infringement.30 If the patent holder does 
not sue, then the FDA proceeds with the approval process for the 
generic drug.31 But if the patent holder files a timely suit, the FDA 
stays approval for thirty months.32 If, during the stay, a court de-
termines that the patent is invalid, the FDA’s approval of the 
ANDA becomes effective on the date the court enters judgment.33 
Because a Paragraph IV certification amounts to constructive in-
fringement34 and usually challenges the validity of an extremely 
 
 23 See 21 USC § 355(j). 
 24 Valley Drug Co v Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 344 F3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir 2003). 
 25 21 USC § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II)–(III). 
 26 21 USC § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 27 Valley Drug, 344 F3d at 1297. 
 28 See 21 USC § 355(j)(2)(B). 
 29 21 USC § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II). 
 30 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 31 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 32 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 33 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa). 
 34 35 USC § 271(e)(2)(A). 
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valuable patent, it almost always triggers litigation by the brand-
name manufacturer to defend its patent.35 If the generic manufac-
turer wins at trial, then it and other generic firms are allowed to 
enter the market. The competition among multiple generic man-
ufacturers rapidly drives down the price of the drug, effectively 
transferring millions or billions of dollars in potential monopoly 
profits from the brand-name manufacturer to consumers.36 
However, because Paragraph IV litigation can be extremely 
expensive, a prospective generic filer faces first-mover disad-
vantages in bringing its patent challenge. The Paragraph IV 
filer’s lawsuit, if successful, enables other generic firms to free 
ride on its legal efforts. These competing generics can enjoy the 
benefits of the patent challenge (namely, market entry) without 
having to incur the costs and risks of the lawsuit. The presence of 
free riders who can immediately enter the market and drive down 
the price of the drug seriously reduces the incentive of generic 
firms to challenge patents in the first place.37 
This is where the unique regulatory provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman Act kick in. The Hatch-Waxman Act gives generic man-
ufacturers a powerful incentive to incur the heavy litigation costs 
of a Paragraph IV suit: it grants the first successful Paragraph IV 
filer a minimonopoly—a 180-day period during which only it may 
legally manufacture a generic version of the challenged drug.38 
Importantly, the first “successful” filer is the first generic firm to 
file an approved Paragraph IV certification, not the first firm to 
actually win a patent challenge.39 Thus, even if the first filer loses 
or settles an infringement lawsuit, subsequent generic firms do 
not become eligible for the 180-day exclusivity period.40 
 
 35 Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd v Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S Ct 1670, 
1677 (2012) (“Filing a paragraph IV certification means provoking litigation.”). 
 36 See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 NYU L Rev 1553, 1557, 1564–67 (2006). 
 37 See id at 1605 (“[P]otential challengers [ ] face a serious free-rider problem. Not 
only will a firm fail to internalize the full benefits of its challenge, . . . but in addition the 
gains will tend to be rapidly dissipated, as other firms enter and compete away the benefits 
of the favorable judgment.”). 
 38 See 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 39 See 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb), (D)(iii). 
 40 See 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). See also Hemphill, 81 NYU L Rev at 1583–86 (cited 
in note 36) (explaining why this is the correct interpretation of § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)); Arkansas 
Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v Bayer AG, 604 F3d 98, 101 & n 4 (2d Cir 2010) 
(citing the Hemphill article and acknowledging that that the court had erred as a matter 
of law when it wrote, in an earlier case, “that the exclusivity period cedes to the first ANDA 
filer to successfully defend”) (emphasis added). 
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The 180-day exclusivity period begins to run, if it runs at all, 
as soon as the first ANDA applicant commercially markets its 
drug.41 Because the price of a drug—and, hence, manufacturers’ 
opportunity for profit—rapidly declines as additional competing 
generic manufacturers enter the market, the exclusivity period 
can be extremely valuable, often worth hundreds of millions of 
dollars.42 Without the exclusivity guarantee, generic manufactur-
ers often have little incentive to challenge the brand-name man-
ufacturer’s patent in the first place.43 
As is the case with most lawsuits, legal challenges brought 
by brand-name manufacturers in response to Paragraph IV fil-
ings are often settled by the parties in a private agreement, rather 
than by a court at trial.44 When these settlement agreements in-
volve cash consideration, they are described as involving “re-
verse” payments because, “rather than demanding damages in 
settlement the brand manufacturer pays a sum of money—often 
a very large sum of money—to the generic manufacturer.”45 This 
flips the usual settlement scenario, in which the alleged infringer 
pays the alleged victim, to one in which the victim pays the al-
leged infringer. 
Under ordinary circumstances in a competitive market, a 
high-value reverse payment would trigger additional patent chal-
lenges, because it signals to other potential generic manufactur-
ers that the patent holder either doubts the validity of its patent 
or is sufficiently risk-averse that it is willing to settle on terms 
that are highly attractive to generic challengers.46 The threat of 
inviting additional litigation would discourage patentees from en-
tering high-value reverse payments in the first place. And, in any 
case, the onslaught of future challenges would make it difficult or 
impossible for a patentee to “buy off” all of its generic challengers. 
 
 41 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). If the validity of the patent is fully litigated, the 180-day 
exclusivity period begins to run as soon as the court issues a final order that the patent is 
invalid or not infringed. 21 CFR § 314.107(c)(1). 
 42 Hemphill, 81 NYU L Rev at 1579 (cited in note 36). 
 43 See id. 
 44 See Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2014 at *4 (cited in note 1) (citing data 
indicating that potential reverse-payment settlements involving “first filers”—in other 
words, Paragraph IV settlements—accounted for 7 percent to 23 percent of all patent set-
tlements between generic and brand-name manufacturers in each year from 2010 to 2014). 
 45 Joshua P. Davis, Applying Litigation Economics to Patent Settlements: Why Re-
verse Payments Should Be Per Se Illegal, 41 Rutgers L J 255, 257 (2009). 
 46 See, for example, Hemphill, 81 NYU L Rev at 1582 (cited in note 36) (noting that 
the Hatch-Waxman Act alters the normal presumption that “there are many potential 
challengers, and paying one merely attracts others”). 
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But these assumptions do not hold under the terms of the Hatch-
Waxman Act. Because only the first generic challenger is eligible 
for the Act’s 180-day exclusivity period—and because, without 
this exclusivity period, the expected costs of litigation would 
likely often exceed the expected gains from a lawsuit47—a brand-
name manufacturer can often effectively protect a patent, even a 
likely invalid one, by “buying off” the first challenger. 
B. Legal Controversy and Actavis 
Federal antitrust enforcers were wary of reverse-payment 
settlements from the beginning, because of their potential to 
harm consumers by keeping prices artificially high and supply ar-
tificially low. The legal controversy surrounding reverse pay-
ments came to a head in the early 2000s, when the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) began challenging these agreements as anti-
competitive—and thus illegal48—restraints of trade.49 The FTC 
argued that these agreements implicate antitrust issues because 
a patent has no exclusionary potential—and thus confers no le-
gitimate monopoly rights—if its holder would not win the under-
lying infringement suit.50 According to the FTC, because it is usu-
ally impossible to know in advance whether the patent holder 
would win at trial, reverse-payment agreements are presump-
tively unlawful unless the court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff would have won at trial.51 
 
 47 See text accompanying notes 42–43. See also generally Tom Engellenner, Compar-
ison of Federal Court, ITC, and USPTO Proceedings in IP Disputes (American Intellectual 
Property Law Association, Jan 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8E54-ED2G (detailing 
the average cost of patent litigation). 
 48 See 15 USC §§ 1–2 (outlawing contracts and conspiracies in restraint of trade and 
attempts to monopolize trade). See also 15 USC § 45(a) (granting the FTC the authority 
to prevent all “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce”). 
 49 See generally, for example, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc v Biovail Corp Interna-
tional, 256 F3d 799 (DC Cir 2001); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F3d 896 
(6th Cir 2003). The FTC was initially a plaintiff in the litigation underlying both of these 
cases, but settled with the defendants via a consent decree. See Andrx, 256 F3d at 817 
n 20. See also Consent Agreement Resolves Complaint against Pharmaceutical Companies 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. and Andrx Corp. (FTC, Apr 2, 2001), archived at 
http://perma.cc/EK67-AB5S. 
 50 See, for example, FTC v Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 677 F3d 1298, 1312 (11th 
Cir 2012). 
 51 See id. There are many reasons why the holder of a valid patent might settle in 
spite of a well-justified belief that it would win at trial. These reasons include risk aver-
sion, concern for negative publicity, and financial prudence (such as when the litigation 
costs exceed the value of the lawsuit). Id at 1313. 
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The federal appellate courts disagreed about the merits of the 
FTC’s argument. Three circuit courts rejected the FTC’s argu-
ment outright, holding that reverse-payment agreements should 
be “immune from antitrust attack so long as [their] anticompeti-
tive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of 
the patent” because the Patent Act’s grant of monopoly power to 
brand-name drug manufacturers shielded agreements concerning 
that lawfully granted monopoly power from antitrust scrutiny.52 
This held true regardless of whether the patent was subsequently 
declared invalid. As the Eleventh Circuit put it, “even a court 
judgment about a patent’s actual exclusionary power, unless that 
judgment comes before settlement, does not count. What does 
count is the patent’s ‘potential exclusionary power’ as it appeared 
at the time of settlement.”53 At the time of the settlement, a patent 
holder has apparent legal monopoly power—and that is what 
matters. 
Courts were also concerned about the implications of accept-
ing the FTC’s argument. Some judges worried that applying anti-
trust scrutiny to reverse-payment agreements within the patent 
term would require courts to adjudicate the likelihood of the pa-
tent holder’s success on the merits, as those merits stood at the 
time of the settlement. Doing this would “require[ ] mining 
through mountains of evidence” and essentially litigating the 
very trial that the settlement was designed to avoid.54 This would 
obviate the benefits of settlement, a consequence that the “legal 
system can ill afford.”55 In addition to being expensive and diffi-
cult, after-the-fact estimates about the likelihood of success on the 
merits are inherently tenuous: “Predicting the future is precari-
ous at best; retroactively predicting from a past perspective a fu-
ture that never occurred is even more perilous.”56 Many courts 
thought it poor public policy to apply antitrust scrutiny, and the 
 
 52 Id at 1312. See also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 
F3d 1323, 1332–37 (Fed Cir 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F3d 
187, 205–13 (2d Cir 2005). 
 53 Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F3d at 1308, quoting Valley Drug, 344 F3d at 1311. 
 54 Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F3d at 1314. See also In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 
F3d at 203–04. 
 55 Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F3d at 1314. See also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochlo-
ride, 544 F3d at 1333 (“[T]here is a long-standing policy in the law in favor of settlements, 
and this policy extends to patent infringement litigation.”). 
 56 Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F3d at 1313. 
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treble damages often entailed by a finding of liability, to such a 
“precarious” inquiry.57 
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit went a step fur-
ther, reasoning that subjecting reverse payments to antitrust 
scrutiny would not only discourage settlements—which are, as a 
general matter, extremely socially valuable58—but also discour-
age generic manufacturers from challenging the brand-name 
manufacturer’s patent in the first place, because removing the 
possibility of a reverse-payment settlement substantially de-
creases the expected value of suing.59 If reverse-payment settle-
ments are permitted, the expected value of a patent challenge in-
cludes not only the expected value of winning, but also the 
expected value of settlement. But if reverse payments are forbid-
den, generic challengers’ only hope of recovery is to win at trial—
a risky prospect. By discouraging patent challenges at the outset, 
a prohibition on reverse payments could have the effect of reduc-
ing competition in the long run.60 
Despite these concerns, some circuit courts took the opposite 
stance and found reverse-payment agreements presumptively un-
lawful, at least when they involve cash consideration and an ex-
plicit promise by the generic to delay or prevent triggering of the 
180-day exclusivity period.61 These courts rested this judgment on 
the “common sense” observation that a “payment flowing from the 
[monopolist] to the challenging generic firm” inherently suggests 
an anticompetitive motive.62 
The Supreme Court resolved the divide among lower courts in 
2013, when it decided Actavis. In Actavis, the Supreme Court struck 
a middle ground, holding in a 5–3 ruling63 that reverse-payment 
 
 57 Id. See also In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F3d at 228; In re Ciprofloxacin Hydro-
chloride, 544 F3d at 1333. 
 58 The judicial policy favoring settlements in patent cases is over a century old. See, 
for example, Bement v National Harrow Co, 186 US 70, 93 (1902) (noting the efficiency 
gains of settlement and emphasizing that the settlement of complex patent litigation, in 
particular, is “a legitimate and desirable result in itself”). For an analysis of the circum-
stances in which patent settlements involving cash consideration are uniquely socially val-
uable, see John E. Lopatka, A Comment on the Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payment Patent 
Settlements: Through the Lens of the Hand Formula, 79 Tulane L Rev 235, 251–53 (2004). 
 59 See Asahi Glass Co v Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 289 F Supp 2d 986, 994 (ND 
Ill 2003) (Posner sitting by designation). 
 60 See id. 
 61 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F3d 197, 214–18 (3d Cir 2012); Andrx 
Pharmaceuticals, 256 F3d at 807–12; In re Cardizem CD, 332 F3d at 907–09. 
 62 In re K-Dur, 686 F3d at 218. 
 63 Justice Samuel Alito did not take part in the decision. Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2226. 
GOWEN_CMT_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016  2:10 PM 
2016] Saving Federal Settlement Privilege after Actavis 1515 
 
agreements are subject to antitrust scrutiny.64 The fact that the 
anticompetitive effects of a reverse payment might fall within the 
monopoly power granted by a patent, the Court held, does not 
immunize the agreement from antitrust scrutiny.65 
The Court outlined “five sets of considerations” in support of 
this conclusion.66 First, the Court determined that some reverse 
payments have the “potential for genuine adverse effects on com-
petition,” because they result in the extension of monopoly power 
over some patents that would otherwise be invalidated.67 This ex-
tension of monopoly power can result in higher prices to consum-
ers, often amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.68 Second, 
the Court found that “these anticompetitive consequences will at 
least sometimes prove unjustified” by “traditional settlement con-
siderations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair value for ser-
vices.”69 Third, “where a reverse payment threatens to work un-
justified anticompetitive harm,” the patent holder usually 
possesses enough market power “to bring that harm about in 
practice.”70 Fourth, the Court determined that antitrust scrutiny 
is administratively feasible, in part because “it is normally not 
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust ques-
tion,” given that “[a]n unexplained large reverse payment itself 
would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts 
about the patent’s survival,” and using a settlement payment “to 
prevent the risk of competition” leads to “the relevant anticom-
petitive harm.”71 Finally, the Court emphasized that litigants 
may still “settle in other ways” such as “by allowing the generic 
manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s 
expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out 
prior to that point.”72 
For these reasons, the Court determined that reverse-payment 
agreements are not immune from antitrust scrutiny. However, the 
Court rejected the FTC’s argument that reverse-payment agree-
ments should be deemed “presumptively unlawful.”73 Instead, it 
 
 64 Id at 2227. 
 65 Id at 2236. 
 66 Id at 2234. 
 67 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2234. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id at 2235–36. 
 70 Id at 2236. 
 71 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236. 
 72 Id at 2237. 
 73 Id. 
GOWEN_CMT_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016  2:10 PM 
1516  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1505 
   
held that courts must analyze these agreements under the “rule 
of reason.”74 Rule-of-reason analysis requires the trier of fact to 
conduct a thorough, searching evaluation of the facts of a case to 
determine whether an agreement that restrains trade unreason-
ably suppresses competition, “taking into account a variety of fac-
tors, including specific information about the relevant business, 
its conditions before and after the restraint was imposed, and the 
restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”75 
In the context of reverse-payment suits, the Court empha-
sized that determining whether a settlement violates antitrust 
laws also requires a trier of fact to scrutinize the parties’ reasons 
for settling: “If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to 
share patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of 
some other justification, the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the 
arrangement.”76 But reverse payments are not forbidden if they 
are motivated by the parties’ desire to avoid litigation costs or 
reputational harms, or to compensate the generic manufacturer 
for counterclaims or services provided.77 Consequently, courts 
should consider any (admissible) “evidence that the patentee 
seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim with 
a share of its monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the 
competitive market.”78 
C. Open Questions and Evidentiary Obstacles 
Despite announcing the legal status of reverse payments and 
the level of scrutiny to be applied, Actavis left many questions 
unanswered, several of which are important for the purposes of 
this Comment. 
First, Actavis emphasized that trial courts must examine 
parties’ motivations for settling in order to determine liability, 
but provided lower courts with no guidance on how to uncover 
those motivations. As Part II of this Comment explains, many 
federal courts have held that settlement communications—which 
are likely to be the best, if not the only, direct evidence of parties’ 
motivations—are shielded by a nearly impenetrable privilege. Be-
cause the Supreme Court did not address how the Actavis frame-
work interacts with settlement privilege, lower federal courts 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 10 (1997). 
 76 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2237. 
 77 See id at 2235–36. 
 78 Id at 2235. 
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that recognize settlement privilege are left between a rock and a 
hard place. How should these courts reconcile their need for evi-
dence in antitrust cases with a robust protection for settlement 
communications? Must courts either roll back settlement privi-
lege or else let some percentage of reverse-payment cases slip by 
for lack of evidence?79 
Second, it is not clear whether the validity of the patent un-
derlying the reverse payment can operate as a defense to an anti-
trust claim. As discussed in Part III.A.2, the answer to this ques-
tion impacts not only the ultimate finding of liability, but also the 
ease with which courts can invoke the crime-fraud doctrine—an 
evidentiary rule according to which no privilege attaches to com-
munications undertaken in furtherance of a crime or fraud80—to 
uncover the settlement communications that led to the reverse-
payment agreement. If the Court’s description of “the relevant an-
ticompetitive harm” of reverse payments as relating to the patent 
holder’s attempt to “prevent the risk” of its patent being invali-
dated81 is read literally, then it appears that even the holder of a 
valid patent violates antitrust laws when it settles out of risk 
aversion. But this logic would also seem to subject settlements 
concerning early market entry—in which the generic manufac-
turer is not paid cash consideration, but is instead allowed to mar-
ket its product before the patent holder’s patent has expired—to 
antitrust scrutiny,82 a result that the Court expressly disclaimed.83 
Third, it is not obvious how a court should proceed if it finds 
that only one of the settling parties entered the reverse-payment 
agreement for impermissible reasons. Presumably the party who 
settled for anticompetitive reasons would be held liable, while the 
 
 79 At least one court has suggested that courts do, in fact, face this harsh, binary 
choice. See In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litigation, Case No 1:12-md-02343, *3–
6 (ED Tenn July 29, 2014) (“Skelaxin Order”) (holding that settlement privilege must be 
upheld even if it deprives reverse-payment plaintiffs of valuable or necessary evidence, 
but noting that this result might mean that settlement privilege should be abandoned 
entirely). 
 80 For a complete definition of the crime-fraud exception, see notes 132–34 and ac-
companying text. 
 81 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236. 
 82 See id at 2245 (Roberts dissenting) (“[T]his logic—that taking away any chance 
that a patent will be invalidated is itself an antitrust problem—cannot possibly be limited 
to reverse-payment agreements, or those that are ‘large.’”). 
 83 Id at 2237 (explaining that litigants may avoid antitrust scrutiny by “settl[ing] in 
other ways,” such as “by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market 
prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out 
prior to that point”). 
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party who settled for innocent reasons likely could not.84 But, for 
reasons discussed in Part III.A.2, it is likely impossible to invoke 
the crime-fraud doctrine to uncover settlement communications 
if only one party entered the settlement for unlawful reasons. 
Part III suggests a way to resolve these ambiguities. But 
first, Part II provides an overview of the origins, purpose, and 
scope of settlement privilege. 
II.  FEDERAL SETTLEMENT PRIVILEGE 
Rules governing privilege and discovery in federal cases are 
outlined in both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). The FRCP sketch the scope 
of discovery, explaining that a party “may obtain discovery re-
garding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s 
claim or defense,” but that this “information need not be admissi-
ble at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”85 In other words, 
privileged information is shielded from discovery. Nonprivileged 
information is, in principle, discoverable so long as it is relevant, 
but it is not necessarily admissible at trial,86 and in some circum-
stances courts may require the party seeking discovery to make a 
heightened showing of need.87 
 
 84 One reason for this presumption is that most reverse-payment cases are brought 
under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 38 Stat 717, 719–21 (1914), 
codified as amended at 15 USC § 45, which, unlike § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 
Stat 209, 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1, does not require an anticompet-
itive agreement between multiple parties (and can therefore be invoked against a single 
actor acting by itself). 
 85 FRCP 26(b)(1). 
 86 For example, FRE 408 provides that evidence of an offer to settle a claim “is not 
admissible . . . to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim,” but it 
leaves open the possibility that these communications could be admitted for other pur-
poses. Thus, even courts that do not recognize a federal settlement privilege would still 
refuse to admit settlement communications into evidence for the purpose of establishing 
liability or damages in the claim about which the settlement communications were made. 
 More generally, FRE 403 specifies that a court may refuse to admit “relevant evidence 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, con-
fusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.” 
 87 For example, attorney work product is not privileged, but is protected under FRCP 
26(b)(3)(A)(ii), which requires that the party seeking to discover work product demonstrate 
“substantial need” for the materials sought and show that it cannot obtain the same infor-
mation through other means. 
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The FRE govern the privileges that federal courts apply in 
federal question cases.88 When Congress first considered the pro-
posed FRE in the 1970s, the proposed rules contained nine enu-
merated privileges.89 But disagreement about which privileges 
should be recognized and what their scope should be was so wide-
spread that Congress eventually erased the proposed privilege 
rules and in their place passed FRE 501,90 which provides: “The 
common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light 
of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any 
of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitu-
tion; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.” 
When FRE 501 was enacted in 1975, there were a handful of 
privileges widely recognized by federal courts, including marital 
testimonial privilege, marital communicative privilege, attorney-
client privilege, and privileges for voting and state secrets.91 But ra-
ther than freeze these privileges as they existed in 1975, FRE 501 
manifested Congress’s “affirmative intention . . . to provide the 
courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-
by-case basis, and to leave the door open to change.”92 
In the first two decades following the enactment of FRE 501, 
courts did not exercise their ability to create new privileges.93 
This changed in 1996, when the Supreme Court decided Jaffee v 
Redmond,94 creating a new “psychotherapist-patient” privilege in 
the process.95 Jaffee marks the first and only time that the Su-
preme Court has exercised its authority under FRE 501 to recog-
nize a privilege not already established in the common law.96 In 
Jaffee, the Court found that four factors are especially relevant to 
determining whether to recognize a new privilege. Those factors 
are: (1) whether the asserted privilege is “rooted in the imperative 
need for confidence and trust”; (2) whether the privilege would 
 
 88 In diversity cases, federal courts must apply state privilege law. See FRE 501. 
 89 See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 FRD 183, 234–
58 (1972). The proposed privilege rules were originally numbered Rules 502–10. Settle-
ment privilege was not one of them. See id. 
 90 See Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 Am U L Rev 59, 87–93 (2002). 
 91 See Jeffrey J. Lauderdale, A New Trend in the Law of Privilege: The Federal Set-
tlement Privilege and the Proper Use of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for the Recognition 
of New Privileges, 35 U Memphis L Rev 255, 260–61, 263–64 (2005). 
 92 Trammel v United States, 445 US 40, 47 (1980) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 93 See Lauderdale, 35 U Memphis L Rev at 276–79 (cited in note 91). 
 94 518 US 1 (1996). 
 95 Id at 15. 
 96 See Lauderdale, 35 U Memphis L Rev at 279–81 (cited in note 91). 
GOWEN_CMT_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016  2:10 PM 
1520  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1505 
   
further normatively desirable public policy ends; (3) whether the 
evidentiary detriment caused by an exercise of the privilege is 
“modest”; and (4) whether denial of the federal privilege would 
frustrate a parallel privilege adopted by the states.97 
In 2003, the Sixth Circuit became the first circuit court to fol-
low the Supreme Court’s lead in Jaffee, using its FRE 501 author-
ity to recognize another privilege not established in common law. 
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co v Chiles Power Supply, Inc,98 the 
Sixth Circuit determined that the Jaffee factors weigh in favor of 
privileging communications made in furtherance of a settle-
ment.99 Specifically, the court noted that: (1) confidentiality is im-
perative for effective settlement negotiations;100 (2) settlements 
serve important public interests by benefiting both parties, dra-
matically reducing litigation costs, unburdening the court system, 
and enhancing judicial efficiency;101 and (3) the evidentiary detri-
ment caused by exercise of the privilege is minimal because set-
tlement negotiations involve a great deal of “puffing,” hypothet-
ical concessions, and similarly unreliable statements.102 The court 
did not explicitly address the fourth Jaffee factor, but it did em-
phasize that settlements serve substantial state and federal in-
terests, and that there is a “historical” tradition at both the state 
and federal levels of protecting settlement negotiations in some 
form.103 
The Goodyear court noted that settlement communications 
are already protected, in a limited way, by FRE 408,104 which pre-
vents parties from using settlement communications to “prove or 
disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.”105 But the 
court concluded that FRE 408 was seriously underprotective of 
settlement communications because it “does not require exclusion 
 
 97 See Jaffee, 518 US at 10–13. 
 98 332 F3d 976 (6th Cir 2003). 
 99 See id at 979–82. Importantly, Goodyear did not hold that a settlement agreement 
itself is privileged—only that communications made in furtherance of such an agreement 
are privileged. Id at 981–82 (“[A]s with other privileges, the relationship itself is not priv-
ileged, but only the underlying communications.”). 
 100 Id at 980. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 981, quoting Cook v Yellow Freight System, Inc, 132 FRD 
548, 554 (ED Cal 1990). 
 103 See Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980–81. 
 104 Id at 979. 
 105 FRE 408(a). For example, if A sues B for $100,000 and B offers to settle the suit 
for $80,000, A cannot use the settlement offer as evidence that her claim must be worth 
at least $80,000. 
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when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving 
bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue 
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or 
prosecution.”106 The court was especially concerned that FRE 408 
does not prevent “some future third party” from admitting settle-
ment communications “on cross examination, under the ruse of 
‘impeachment evidence’” or bias evidence, when the actual pur-
pose and effect of such an admission is to prejudice the fact finder 
against the settling party.107 
The evidentiary “ruse” mentioned by the court frequently 
arises in tort suits against product manufacturers,108 many of 
which follow a similar pattern: Plaintiff A brings a product lia-
bility suit against Manufacturer; the parties settle on terms fa-
vorable to Plaintiff A; later, Plaintiff B sues Manufacturer for a 
similar defect; at trial, Manufacturer’s witness testifies that 
Plaintiff B’s suit lacks merit; Plaintiff B then admits into evi-
dence the prior settlement negotiations, claiming that statements 
in those negotiations show that the witness is “bias[ed] or preju-
dice[d].”109 Whether or not the settlement negotiations actually do 
show the witness’s bias, admission of the unfavorable settlement 
details is likely to prejudice the fact finder against Manufacturer. 
This result deters parties from “propos[ing] the types of compro-
mises that most effectively lead to settlement” in the first place, 
with the end result being fewer settlements and an accompanying 
loss of “judicial efficiency.”110 
These policy arguments notwithstanding, the Sixth Circuit is 
an outlier among its sister circuits. Only two other appellate 
courts have considered whether to recognize federal settlement 
privilege, and both declined to do so. The Seventh Circuit was the 
first circuit court to consider the issue, in dictum, in the 1979 case 
In re General Motors Corp Engine Interchange Litigation.111 In 
that case, the Seventh Circuit summarily remarked in a footnote 
that it found “no convincing basis for . . . [recognizing a settlement 
privilege] here.”112 However, the issue of whether settlement com-
munications should be privileged was not raised by the parties, 
 
 106 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 979, quoting FRE 408(b) (1975), amended Apr 12, 2006 (quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 107 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980. 
 108 See, for example, id. 
 109 FRE 408(b). 
 110 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980. 
 111 594 F2d 1106 (7th Cir 1979). 
 112 Id at 1124 n 20. 
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and—because Jaffee had not yet been decided—the Seventh Cir-
cuit did not have the benefit of examining the issue under the 
Jaffee factors. More recently, the Federal Circuit categorically re-
jected the possibility of recognizing settlement privilege in In re 
MSTG, Inc,113 concluding that the benefits of encouraging settle-
ment are outweighed by the evidentiary deficit that could result 
from shielding all settlement communications from discovery.114 
Although the Sixth, Seventh, and Federal Circuits are the 
only appellate courts to have explicitly considered the merits of 
recognizing settlement privilege, many district courts have con-
sidered the issue, and they are divided. The Southern District of 
California115 and Eastern District of California116 have employed 
reasoning similar to that of the Goodyear decision in recognizing 
a settlement privilege. Seven district courts have come out the 
other way, usually in cursory opinions that cite the Federal Cir-
cuit’s analysis in In re MSTG.117 And at least one district court 
has issued inconsistent opinions on the matter.118 
 
 113 675 F3d 1337 (Fed Cir 2012). 
 114 See id at 1342–48. 
 115 See California v Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, LP, 2010 WL 3988448, *3–4 (SD 
Cal) (recognizing settlement privilege on public policy grounds). 
 116 See Cook, 132 FRD at 554 (“[W]hile it is true that Rule 408 is addressed to the 
inadmissibility of evidence at trial . . . the same consideration of policy . . . also appl[ies] 
to settlement [negotiations between the defendant and a third party].”). 
 117 See Spilker v Medtronic, Inc, 2014 WL 4760292, *3 (ED NC) (“[W]hen determining 
whether a settlement agreement is producible in discovery . . . relevance, rather than ad-
missibility, is the appropriate inquiry.”); ABT Systems, LLC v Emerson Electric Co, 2012 
WL 6594996, *2 (ED Mo) (“The Eighth Circuit has not adopted a settlement negotiation 
privilege and this Court agrees with the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the issue in In re 
MSTG.”); Eisai Inc v Sanofi-Aventis US, LLC, 2011 WL 5416334, *7 (D NJ) (holding that 
settlement negotiations are not privileged but that parties seeking to discover the contents 
of these negotiations must make a heightened showing of relevance); In re Urethane Anti-
trust Litigation, 2009 WL 2058759, *3–4 (D Kan) (“[P]laintiffs have not met their burden 
of establishing that a settlement privilege exists.”); Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford 
Junior University v Tyco International Ltd, 253 FRD 521, 523 (CD Cal 2008) (noting that 
there is no widespread acceptance of a federal settlement privilege and declining to recog-
nize such a privilege); Phoenix Solutions Inc v Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 254 FRD 568, 585 
(ND Cal 2008) (“The court finds no convincing basis for Phoenix’s proposition that its li-
censing negotiation communications are protected from discovery by a settlement privi-
lege.”); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v Mediatek, Inc, 2007 WL 963975, *6 (ND Cal); 
In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 370 F Supp 2d 201, 
208–13 (DDC 2005). 
 118 Contrast Datatreasury Corp v Wells Fargo & Co, 2010 WL 903259, *2 (ED Tex) 
(allowing discovery of litigation-related documents from previous lawsuits in a case in 
which the parties did not raise the privilege), with Software Tree, LLC v Red Hat, Inc, 
2010 WL 2788202, *4 (ED Tex) (holding that any communications made in furtherance of 
settlement are privileged and hence cannot be discovered). 
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In sum, 12 percent of federal trial courts in the United States 
recognize settlement privilege,119 and more may do so in the fu-
ture. As reverse-payment cases are litigated in these courts, 
judges and parties will continue to confront difficult questions 
about how to reconcile a principled protection of settlement com-
munications with the evidentiary inquiry into the settling parties’ 
motivations that Actavis demands. Part III explores these ques-
tions in detail and proposes two possible solutions. 
III.  APPLICATION: SETTLEMENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
REVERSE-PAYMENT AGREEMENTS 
Because a defendant’s liability in reverse-payment suits un-
der Actavis hinges on the motivation and terms of the settlement 
agreement,120 it is imperative for courts to determine whether 
communications made in furtherance of those settlements are 
shielded from discovery by a settlement privilege. 
One district court in the Sixth Circuit, the Eastern District 
of Tennessee, has confronted this issue in an ongoing antitrust 
case, In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litigation.121 The 
Skelaxin plaintiffs—three drug stores who brought suit under § 4 
of the Clayton Act122—allege that the brand-name defendant and 
generic-challenger defendant had entered into an anticompetitive 
reverse-payment settlement that allowed the brand-name de-
fendant to preserve its invalid patent over the muscle-relaxant 
metaxalone (also known by its brand name, “Skelaxin”).123 Accord-
ing to the drug stores, the reverse payment injured their busi-
nesses by forcing them to pay “hundreds of millions of dollars 
 
 119 The nine district courts in the Sixth Circuit plus the two district courts discussed 
above account for eleven of the ninety-four federal district courts in the United States. 
 120 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2235, 2237 (explaining that courts should consider “evidence 
that the patentee seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share 
of its monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the competitive market” and stating 
that “[i]f the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to share patent-generated monopoly 
profits, then, in the absence of some other justification, the antitrust laws are likely to 
forbid the arrangement”). 
 121 Case No 1:12-md-2343 (ED Tenn 2014). 
 122 38 Stat 730, 731 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC § 15 (authorizing injured 
private parties to sue “by reason of anything forbidden in the [federal] antitrust laws”). 
 123 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Liti-
gation, Case No 1:12-md-2343, *3 (ED Tenn filed Jan 4, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 
2013 WL 146097). 
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more” to obtain the drug than they would have paid under com-
petitive conditions.124 The plaintiffs sought to discover the settle-
ment communications in order to help prove their case. The court 
recognized that the settlement communications would be “highly 
probative” of the defendant’s liability, and expressed concern 
about the wisdom of Goodyear’s creation of a settlement privilege 
in light of Actavis.125 
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that it did not have 
authority to roll back the settlement privilege created in Goodyear 
or “to reweigh the public policy considerations underlying” that de-
cision.126 The district court therefore held that the settlement com-
munications at issue were privileged—even though upholding such 
a privilege “deprive[s] plaintiffs of valuable evidence.”127 
Skelaxin is the first (and, so far, the only) case to grapple with 
the application of settlement privilege in the context of a reverse-
payment suit. The court in that case was right to suggest that the 
application of settlement privilege to reverse-payment communi-
cations makes little sense from a public policy perspective: it has 
the effect of protecting all communications surrounding an agree-
ment that is alleged to be unlawful, but whose unlawfulness can 
only be determined through a detailed evaluation of the parties’ 
motivations and of the “context” in which the agreement took 
place.128 But courts and litigants seeking discovery of reverse-
payment settlement communications have options for reaching 
those documents that the Skelaxin court did not explore. These 
options, detailed in this Part, could allow courts to access settle-
ment communications in reverse-payment cases without aban-
doning their commitment to—or compromising the integrity of—
settlement privilege. 
Part III.A explains how plaintiffs—whether federal antitrust 
enforcers or private parties suing under the Clayton Act’s private 
right of action129—can use the crime-fraud doctrine to pierce de-
fendants’ settlement privilege in certain reverse-payment chal-
lenges. The crime-fraud doctrine has the advantage of being a 
well-established rule of evidence that applies to nearly all—if not 
 
 124 Id. 
 125 Skelaxin Order at *3–5 (cited in note 79). 
 126 Id at *3–4. 
 127 Id at *5. 
 128 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2237. 
 129 See 15 USC §§ 15–15a. 
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all—recognized privileges.130 And it is likely to be quite successful 
in a certain class of suits—suits in which there is strong prima 
facie evidence that both parties to the reverse payment entered 
into the settlement for anticompetitive reasons.131 However, the 
crime-fraud doctrine is often difficult and expensive to invoke, 
and there are many cases in which it is unlikely to be successful. 
Part III.B suggests a simpler, more straightforward alterna-
tive to the crime-fraud doctrine. Namely, courts could invoke the 
common-law “necessity exception” to find settlement privilege in-
applicable when the settlement itself is the subject of a lawsuit. 
The necessity exception is less well-established than the crime-
fraud doctrine—and so in some sense is a riskier litigation strat-
egy—but there are powerful reasons for thinking that it applies 
in the context of settlement privilege. Importantly, the necessity 
exception, unlike the crime-fraud doctrine, is inexpensive for 
plaintiffs to invoke, easy for judges to apply, and is not likely to 
lead to inconsistent results across cases. 
By pursuing one or both of these approaches, plaintiffs in 
reverse-payment suits will likely be able to discover communi-
cations leading up to reverse-payment settlements, thereby en-
abling courts to comply with the mandate of Actavis and evalu-
ate parties’ motivations in settling. 
A. The Crime-Fraud Limitation in the Context of Reverse-
Payment Suits 
The crime-fraud limitation132 on evidentiary privileges is a 
common-law doctrine with roots in eighteenth-century English 
 
 130 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence; Eviden-
tiary Privileges § 6.13.2(d) at 1167–68 (Aspen 2d ed 2010) (explaining that “[a]lthough 
most of the published opinions” discuss the crime-fraud doctrine in terms of the attorney-
client privilege, apparently “all other professional privileges, including the psychotherapist-
patient, general medical, and accountant-client privileges, are subject to the exception,” 
as are “personal privileges such as the spousal privilege”). There has been some contro-
versy as to whether the crime-fraud doctrine fully applies in the context of the priest-
penitent privilege, but this controversy is “more apparent than real” because the priest-
penitent privilege, as traditionally understood, cannot be invoked at all when a penitent 
communicates with a religious leader for a “bad faith” purpose, such as furthering crime 
or fraud. See id § 6.13.2(d) at 1167 n 151. 
 131 For example, postsettlement statements by executives—to associates, employees, 
or one another—boasting that the settlement allows either company to maintain or share 
monopoly profits would constitute strong prima facie evidence of anticompetitive intent. 
 132 Many courts and scholars refer to the crime-fraud doctrine as an “exception” to 
privilege rather than as a “limitation” on privilege, but that terminology is somewhat mis-
leading. The rationale underlying the crime-fraud doctrine is that privilege never attaches 
in the first place to communications that are undertaken in furtherance of crime or fraud. 
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jurisprudence.133 According to the crime-fraud doctrine, no privi-
lege attaches to communications undertaken in furtherance of 
crime, fraud, or similar misconduct.134 
At first blush, it may seem inappropriate to apply the crime-
fraud doctrine to reverse-payment suits, most of which are nei-
ther criminal nor fraudulent in the strict sense of those terms. 
But this intuition is incorrect for two reasons. First, even though 
most reverse-payment suits are brought in a civil action—either 
by FTC enforcers or by private parties—anticompetitive reverse 
payments are also prohibited by the Sherman Act, which is a 
criminal statute.135 Because the crime-fraud doctrine prevents 
privilege from attaching to covered communications in the first 
place, the doctrine is not confined to suits centered on the alleged 
crime or fraud.136 In other words, once a communication has been 
made in furtherance of a crime or fraud, any future litigant can 
discover that communication and admit it as evidence at trial.137 
 
See note 136 and accompanying text. Understood in this way, the crime-fraud doctrine is 
a limitation on the scope of privilege, rather than a mechanism for admitting legitimately 
privileged information. This distinction is of little practical importance, however, since it 
is only after examining the supposedly privileged communications (and thereby piercing 
any privilege that might exist) that courts can determine whether the crime-fraud doctrine 
applies. See text accompanying notes 161–62. 
 133 See David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-
Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 NC L Rev 443, 446–50 (1986) 
(tracing the origins of the crime-fraud doctrine to a 1743 English case). 
 134 Clark v United States, 289 US 1, 15 (1933). 
 135 See 15 USC §§ 1–2 (outlawing and defining criminal penalties for contracts and 
conspiracies in restraint of trade and attempts to monopolize trade). See also Actavis, 133 
S Ct at 2227, 2232–33 (noting that anticompetitive reverse payments—as defined by the 
Court in that opinion—are prohibited by the Sherman Act in addition to the FTC Act). 
 136 See Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore § 6.13.2(d)(1) at 1184 (cited in note 130) (not-
ing that “all [ ] courts” agree with this view). 
 137 Id (“If there is no privilege to begin with, it is immaterial whether the exception is 
invoked in a prosecution for that crime or in another proceeding.”). For example, suppose 
a plaintiff sues an auto manufacturer for wrongful death after her spouse dies in a car 
crash. In gathering evidence for her suit, the plaintiff wants to access communications 
about the crash that took place between the car’s manufacturer and its attorneys—com-
munications that are subject to attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff can pierce attorney-
client privilege and access the communicative documents by making out a prima facie case 
that the internal investigations included a plan to falsify evidence or testimony, even 
though the underlying lawsuit is a civil tort claim and not a criminal perjury charge. See, 
for example, Ake v General Motors Corp, 942 F Supp 869, 876 (WDNY 1996) (finding the 
crime-fraud doctrine applicable on similar facts, though ultimately concluding that the 
plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof in showing that a crime had occurred). For this 
same reason, the crime-fraud doctrine could be invoked to forfeit the privilege surrounding 
settlement communications made in furtherance of an antitrust violation, even if the un-
derlying charge is brought in a civil context (such as § 5 of the FTC Act) rather than a 
criminal one (such as § 1 of the Sherman Act). 
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Second, every court to consider the issue has held that the crime-
fraud doctrine encompasses civil antitrust violations and similar 
quasi-fraudulent business torts.138 
But in order to invoke the crime-fraud doctrine, a litigant 
must do more than simply allege that an antitrust violation oc-
curred. To invoke the crime-fraud doctrine to pierce an eviden-
tiary privilege, the party seeking discovery of privileged commu-
nications—in the reverse-payment case, the plaintiff or 
prosecutor—must make a two-part showing. 
First, the plaintiff must convince the court to undertake an 
in camera (that is, private and confidential) review of the commu-
nicative documents being sought. This requires the plaintiff to 
make a factual showing “adequate to support a good faith belief 
by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials 
may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud 
[doctrine] applies.”139 If the party seeking discovery makes this 
threshold showing, the judge must exercise his discretion in de-
ciding whether to conduct in camera review, “in light of the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case,” including the length 
and number of documents in question, their probative value, and 
the likelihood that the crime-fraud doctrine will, in fact, apply.140 
If this showing is not made, the inquiry ends and the plaintiff is 
barred from discovering the documents. 
Second, once the judge has examined the documents through 
in camera review, the plaintiff must show that the documents es-
tablish a “prima facie case” of crime or fraud.141 Only the specific 
documents found to be in furtherance of crime or fraud may be 
admitted or relied upon at trial.142 
Because anticompetitive restraints of trade violate the fed-
eral antitrust laws,143 the crime-fraud limitation applies to anti-
competitive reverse-payment agreements. But this generalization 
 
 138 See In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapple Antitrust Litigation, 2007 WL 64189, *17 
(SDNY) (collecting cases). 
 139 United States v Zolin, 491 US 554, 572 (1989) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Clark, 289 US at 14. See also Zolin, 491 US at 563 n 7 (cautioning that the Clark 
Court’s use of the phrase “prima facie case” does not necessarily mean that the defendant 
is not allowed to present evidence rebutting the plaintiff’s showing). 
 142 See, for example, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 419 F3d 329, 343 (5th Cir 2005) 
(explaining that the crime-fraud limitation “does not extend to all communications made 
[between two parties] . . . but rather is limited to those communications and documents in 
furtherance of the contemplated or ongoing criminal or fraudulent conduct”). 
 143 15 USC §§ 1, 45. 
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is question-begging, since not all reverse-payment agreements are 
anticompetitive. Because Actavis held that the legality of reverse-
payment agreements must be adjudicated on a case-by-case ba-
sis,144 litigants seeking to invoke this exception in reverse-payment 
suits can expect to encounter fact-specific procedural and practical 
hurdles. These difficulties are explored below. 
1. Preliminary hurdles: ownership and waivability of 
settlement privilege. 
Although the crime-fraud limitation applies to every privi-
lege, the precise contours of the crime-fraud doctrine vary de-
pending on the nature of the privilege at issue and the function 
that the privilege serves. Because settlement privilege is a rela-
tively new doctrine, some of its features have not yet been defined 
by federal courts. Nevertheless, these details will be highly rele-
vant to litigants in reverse-payment cases (and other cases in 
which settlement privilege is invoked). 
One fundamental principle of privilege law is that a privilege 
may be waived only by the person to whom it belongs.145 Different 
types of privileges belong to different persons. For example, be-
cause attorney-client privilege exists to protect the interests of 
the client, the privilege belongs to the client.146 For this reason, 
only the client may waive the privilege.147 It therefore follows that 
attorney-client privilege is forfeited under the crime-fraud doc-
trine only when the client seeks an attorney’s advice in order to 
commit a crime, even if the attorney is unaware that her advice 
is assisting in a criminal plan.148 In contrast, marital communica-
tive privilege exists to protect open and honest communication in 
 
 144 See text accompanying notes 73–78. 
 145 Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham Jr, 24 Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 5507 at 577 (West 1986) (“[C]ommon law permits waiver only by a ‘holder’ of the 
privilege.”) (citation omitted). 
 146 See Upjohn Co v United States, 449 US 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v United States, 
445 US 40, 51 (1980) (noting that the privilege “rests on the need for the advocate and 
counselor to know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the 
professional mission is to be carried out”). 
 147 See In re United States, 590 F3d 1305, 1310 (Fed Cir 2009) (explaining that attorney-
client privilege “belongs to the client, who alone may waive it”). 
 148 See Zolin, 491 US at 563 (“It is the purpose of the crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege to assure that the seal of secrecy between lawyer and client does 
not extend to communications made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission 
of a fraud or crime.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Imwinkelried, The New 
Wigmore § 6.13.2(d)(1) at 1170 (cited in note 130). 
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marriage,149 an interest held by both spouses. Because marital 
communicative privilege serves both members of a married cou-
ple, waiver of the privilege typically requires the consent of both 
spouses.150 Just as both spouses are required to disclaim the priv-
ilege in the case of explicit waiver, the crime-fraud limitation does 
not dissolve marital privilege unless both spouses engaged in the 
communication for the purpose of furthering a crime or fraud.151 
Because settlement privilege protects the ability of all parties 
to a lawsuit “to negotiate and settle a case,”152 the privilege almost 
certainly attaches to each party, rather than to only one party.153 
And because each party has a right to exercise privilege over set-
tlement communications, waiver of the privilege requires the con-
sent of each party. It therefore follows that privilege is waived 
under the crime-fraud doctrine only if both parties undertake set-
tlement communications for purposes of committing crime or 
fraud. But this result limits the applicability of the crime-fraud 
doctrine in the reverse-payment context, because occasionally 
only one party—the patent holder—enters the agreement with 
the forbidden purpose “to share patent-generated monopoly prof-
its” and thereby “prevent the risk of competition.”154 The chal-
lenger may have entered the agreement for innocent reasons, in-
cluding a belief that it was likely to lose the underlying litigation 
(a motive that is anticompetitive when held by the patentee, but 
competitively neutral when held by the challenger).155 In other 
 
 149 Wolfle v United States, 291 US 7, 14 (1934) (“The basis of the immunity given to 
communications between husband and wife is the protection of marital confidences, re-
garded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the 
disadvantages to the administration of justice which the privilege entails.”). 
 150 See Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham Jr, 25 Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 5584 at 699 (West 1989). 
 151 See, for example, United States v Rakes, 136 F3d 1, 4 n 5 (1st Cir 1998) (“In federal 
courts, the marital communications privilege typically is forfeited only where both hus-
band and wife are jointly engaged in criminal activity [or fraud] or where the victim is the 
other spouse or some other family member.”). 
 152 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980. 
 153 At least one case has acknowledged in passing that settlement privilege belongs 
to both parties, although the question has apparently not been litigated directly. See, for 
example, Grupo Condumex, SA de CV v SPX Corp, 331 F Supp 2d 623, 629–30 (ND Ohio 
2004) (finding that neither of the two parties to a settlement “waived their settlement 
privilege”) (emphasis added). 
 154 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236–37. 
 155 See note 156. Note also that the generic challenger has a strong incentive to claim 
this innocent motive because doing so allows it to avoid antitrust liability in the present 
case and signals to other defendants in future cases that it is a “safe” party to settle with. 
Antitrust enforcers who set out to refute this claimed motive face an uphill battle because, 
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words, there are likely to be reverse-payment cases in which only 
one party harbors the intent needed to trigger the crime-fraud 
limitation.156 In these cases, the crime-fraud doctrine cannot be 
invoked to forfeit the privilege. 
2. The two-step analysis in reverse-payment suits. 
If the plaintiff can overcome the ownership obstacle, it must 
complete a two-part showing to demonstrate that the communi-
cations were actually undertaken in furtherance of an antitrust 
violation.157 This showing entails its own procedural hurdles. 
Recall that the first step of the crime-fraud showing requires 
the moving party (in reverse-payment cases, the plaintiff) to pre-
sent enough factual evidence to convince a reasonable trier of fact 
that it is likely that the crime-fraud exception will apply.158 This 
showing is not difficult in the reverse-payment context. To make 
it past the first step, the plaintiff need convince a judge only that 
it is reasonable to believe that (1) the reverse-payment settlement 
might be an illegal restraint of trade, and (2) the communications 
were made in furtherance of that settlement.159 The second show-
ing is easily met because all settlement communications are, by 
definition, “made in furtherance” of the settlement.160 The first 
 
even if a litigant believes it is likely to lose a case at trial, a savvy litigant will likely avoid 
spelling out its pessimism during negotiations. 
 156 This result stems from basic elements of the Supreme Court’s formulation of lia-
bility in Actavis. Namely, if antitrust liability really is predicated on the attempt to “pre-
vent the risk of competition,” Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236, then it follows that entrance into 
a settlement could be illegal for one party (the party whose motive is to benefit from sup-
pression of competition) but legal for its counterpart (who is unaware of the anticompeti-
tive effects). For example, suppose that—midway through patent litigation—the generic 
manufacturer determines that the brand-name manufacturer’s drug patent is likely valid 
after all, while the patent holder becomes convinced (perhaps on the basis of evidence yet 
unavailable to the generic challenger) that it is not. The patent-holder proposes a reverse 
payment to avoid losing its monopoly power, while the generic challenger accepts the 
agreement for the simple and innocent reason that it believes it would lose the underlying 
litigation. From the challenger’s perspective, the agreement poses no anticompetitive 
harms (because the challenger believes that the monopoly will remain in place regardless 
of whether or not it settles), and therefore the challenger—unlike the defendant patent 
holder—would not be liable for violating federal antitrust law under a literal reading of 
Actavis. 
 157 See text accompanying notes 139–41. 
 158 See Zolin, 491 US at 572. 
 159 See Mattenson v Baxter Healthcare Corp, 438 F3d 763, 768–69 (7th Cir 2006). The 
party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud doctrine has wide latitude in making this threshold 
showing and may rely on “any relevant evidence, lawfully obtained, that has not been ad-
judicated to be privileged.” Zolin, 491 US at 575. 
 160 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 983. 
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showing is also easily met; it asks only whether a reasonable per-
son could believe that the settlement agreement might be ille-
gal.161 In reverse-payment cases, the subject of the crime-fraud in-
quiry is also the subject of the lawsuit, so the first showing will 
be met any time a case has made it past the pleading stage—that 
is, any time the plaintiff has presented “enough fact to raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of ille-
gal agreement.”162 
Once the judge has examined the settlement communica-
tions, the plaintiff must show that these communications estab-
lish a “prima facie case” of an antitrust violation.163 Appellate 
courts have struggled to characterize the exact quantum of proof 
needed to establish a prima facie case,164 although all agree evi-
dence must do more than raise mere suspicion of an antitrust vi-
olation. For example, the DC, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits 
have held that the crime-fraud limitation may be invoked only if 
the materials at issue constitute a showing that, if unrebutted, 
would result in a finding of crime or fraud.165 The First, Second, 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have been less stringent, defining a 
prima facie case as a case in which there is probable cause to be-
lieve, based on the evidence, that the crime or fraud occurred.166 
Under either standard, there are ambiguities about what a 
prima facie case should look like in the reverse-payment context. 
One source of confusion is that Actavis leaves some room for doubt 
 
 161 Zolin, 491 US at 572. 
 162 Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544, 556 (2007). 
 163 Clark, 289 US at 14. 
 164 See Zolin, 491 US at 563 n 7. 
 165 See In re Sealed Case, 107 F3d 46, 50 (DC Cir 1997) (“The government satisfies its 
burden of proof if it offers evidence that if believed by the trier of fact would establish the 
elements of an ongoing or imminent crime or fraud.”); United States v Doe, 429 F3d 450, 
454 (3d Cir 2005) (“A prima facie showing requires evidence which, if believed by the fact-
finder, would be sufficient to support a finding that the elements of the crime-fraud [limi-
tation] were met.”) (quotation marks omitted); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 401 F3d 247, 
251 (4th Cir 2005) (“[Evidence] must be such as to subject the opposing party to the risk 
of non-persuasion if the evidence as to the disputed fact is left unrebutted.”) (quotation 
marks omitted); In re International Systems and Controls Corp Securities Litigation, 693 
F2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir 1982). 
 166 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F3d 18, 22–23 & n 4 (1st Cir 2005) (requir-
ing “a reasonable basis to believe that the [communications furthered] . . . a crime or 
fraud,” which the court went on to define as “something less than a mathematical (more 
likely than not) probability”); In re Richard Roe, Inc, 68 F3d 38, 40 (2d Cir 1995); In re 
Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F2d 155, 165–66 (6th Cir 1986) (“[T]here are not practical dif-
ferences between the probable cause standard and the prima facie standards formulated 
in the circuits.”) (citations omitted); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F3d 377, 381 (9th 
Cir 1996). 
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about whether a patent’s validity can operate as a defense in the 
underlying antitrust lawsuit.167 If a patent’s validity can operate 
as a defense, almost no communications made in furtherance of 
the settlement could make out a prima facie case of an antitrust 
violation, at least when an apparently legitimate validity defense 
is raised in the underlying lawsuit. Even a statement by the pa-
tent holder acknowledging poor probability of success on the mer-
its would not raise a prima facie case of invalidity, since patent 
validity is an objective inquiry determined by the courts.168 In 
other words, a party’s opinion about the validity of its patent is 
not directly relevant to a court’s analysis of the validity—unless, 
of course, this opinion is based on evidence not in the record. 
However, if validity is not a defense—if the only relevant le-
gal question is whether the patent holder intended to restrain 
trade by avoiding the chance of its patent being invalidated—then 
the content of settlement negotiations is likely to be quite rele-
vant. These communications may well reveal whether a patent 
holder is motivated by uncertainty about its patent, or by other 
legitimate factors like a desire to compensate the other party for 
services provided169 or to avoid litigation costs, including the rep-
utational harms and negative press attention that often accom-
pany lawsuits. 
A more basic problem has to do with the standard of liability 
in reverse-payment cases. As discussed above, Actavis suggests 
that the relevant anticompetitive harm results from the par-
ties’ attempt to suppress the risk of competition.170 But imagine 
a reverse-payment lawsuit in which it is ambiguous—based on 
the evidence in the record—whether the motivation behind the 
settlement was suppression of competition or something else. To 
overcome its burden of proof, the plaintiff needs to access the set-
tlement communications, which are shielded by privilege. In 
 
 167 The Supreme Court has suggested, without holding, that courts should take into 
account defenses raised to the underlying claim when evaluating whether or not the mov-
ing party has made out a prima facie showing of crime or fraud. See note 141. As of the 
time of writing, only one lower court has grappled with the issue. See Time Insurance Co 
v AstraZeneca AB, 52 F Supp 3d 705, 710–12 (ED Pa 2014) (holding that when damages, 
as opposed to injunctive relief, are sought parties may be required to litigate the validity 
of a patent). 
 168 See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2239–40 (Roberts dissenting) (observing that patent va-
lidity is an objective inquiry). 
 169 For example, many patent settlements—including reverse payments—contain 
provisions in which the challenger agrees to market or otherwise promote some of the 
patentee’s products. See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2229. 
 170 Id at 2237. 
GOWEN_CMT_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016  2:10 PM 
2016] Saving Federal Settlement Privilege after Actavis 1533 
 
many circuits, the plaintiff can invoke the crime-fraud limitation 
to access these communications only if it can prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that they were in furtherance of an anti-
trust violation. But whether the reverse payment amounts to an 
antitrust violation depends on the motivations of the parties—
motivations that can be determined (in this hypothetical) only by 
examining the settlement communications. This circularity could 
thwart many plaintiffs,171 and it seems likely to arise in those 
reverse-payment cases in which nonprivileged evidence about the 
settling parties’ motives is either ambiguous or nonexistent. 
* * * 
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the crime-fraud doc-
trine can be invoked to forfeit settlement privilege in at least some 
reverse-payment cases. But litigants seeking to uncover privi-
leged communications will face a number of obstacles in applying 
the doctrine, including (1) the potential dual ownership of the 
privilege,172 (2) the patent-validity defense,173 and (3) the some-
what circular requirement inherent in the standard for liability, 
which requires the introduction of nonprivileged evidence of anti-
competitive intent before the exception can be invoked.174 
B. A Necessity Exception to Settlement Privilege 
Although the crime-fraud doctrine will likely allow plaintiffs 
to admit critical evidence in some reverse-payment cases, invok-
ing the crime-fraud doctrine is costly, error prone, and time con-
suming––and plaintiffs will not always be able to meet the doc-
trine’s evidentiary requirements. This Section proposes an 
alternative solution, which has the benefit of uniformly applying 
to all reverse-payment suits: courts can invoke the common-law 
“necessity doctrine” and hold settlement privilege inapplicable in 
lawsuits in which the settlement itself is at issue. 
Like the crime-fraud limitation, the necessity exception lim-
its parties’ ability to claim evidentiary privilege in certain narrow 
 
 171 See, for example, Richard McMillan Jr, Mary Bram, and M. Brinkley Tappan, Solv-
ing the Procedural Quagmire for Testing Reverse Payment Settlements, 11 Minn J L Sci & 
Tech 801, 823–26 (2010) (noting the possibility that prosecutors could invoke the crime-
fraud doctrine in reverse-payment prosecutions, but observing that procedural obstacles 
would likely prevent the doctrine from applying in all but the most “exceptional case[s]”). 
 172 See text accompanying notes 146–56. 
 173 See text accompanying notes 167–68. 
 174 See text accompanying notes 170–71. 
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circumstances. But unlike the crime-fraud doctrine, the necessity 
exception to privilege is a straightforward, rule-like doctrine that 
is easy for plaintiffs to invoke and equally easy for courts to ad-
minister. This Part discusses the important role that the neces-
sity doctrine has played in other areas of evidence law—most im-
portantly attorney-client privilege—and then analyzes how that 
doctrine would apply in the settlement privilege context. This 
Part concludes that litigants can invoke the necessity exception 
to settlement privilege in any case in which the legality of the 
settlement itself is at issue. Reverse-payment cases plainly fall 
into this category: in reverse-payment lawsuits, the legality of the 
settlement agreement is precisely the legal question that courts 
must adjudicate. 
1. Origins and applications of the necessity exception. 
The so-called necessity exception has deep common-law 
roots.175 It limits privilege in a narrow, clearly defined set of cases. 
In this sense, it operates similarly to the crime-fraud doctrine. 
But while the crime-fraud limitation prevents privilege from at-
taching to communications that are undertaken in furtherance of 
illegal activity, the necessity exception allows privilege to be over-
come when the privileged communications—or the relationship at 
the heart of those communications—are themselves the subject of 
litigation. 
Although the necessity exception has never been invoked in 
a settlement privilege case, it has long played an important role 
in limiting other forms of privilege—most notably, marital com-
municative privilege, spousal testimonial privilege, and attorney-
client privilege.176 In the case of marital communications, the ex-
ception is as old as the privilege itself; for centuries, courts have 
invoked the necessity doctrine to allow victim-spouses to testify 
 
 175 See James Calhoun Johnson, Note, Evidence—Husband and Wife—Admission in 
Evidence—Victim-Wife’s Testimony May Be Compelled in Prosecution of Husband for 
Mann Act Violation, 39 Tex L Rev 508, 510 & n 11 (1961) (tracing the origin of the neces-
sity exception to the 1631 trial of Lord Audley, in which the English Privy Council recog-
nized the right of an injured wife to testify against her husband, despite the usual rule 
deeming spouses incompetent to testify for or against one another). See also Lord Audley’s 
Case, 123 Eng Rep 1140, 1141 (CP 1631). 
 176 In the context of attorney-client privilege, courts and commentators usually do not 
use the “necessity exception” terminology. Instead, they tend to use ad hoc language, such 
as “joint-client exception” or “wrongful discharge exception.” See note 185. But the ra-
tionale for these exceptions in attorney-client privilege cases is identical to the core ra-
tionale underlying the necessity exception in spousal privilege cases. See text accompany-
ing notes 185–87. 
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against defendant-spouses in domestic violence cases, thereby 
breaching the defendant-spouse’s communication privilege.177 
Courts have also invoked the necessity exception to compel un-
willing victim-spouses to testify in domestic violence and sex-
crime prosecutions, thereby breaching the victim-spouse’s testi-
monial privilege.178 
Courts justify these necessity exceptions in many ways, 
sometimes without formal reference to the necessity exception at 
all.179 Some judges analogize the necessity exception (often refer-
ring to it as “[t]he public policy exception”) to the crime-fraud lim-
itation and describe the defendant-spouse as “waiving” his privi-
lege when he commits a crime against his wife or against the 
couple’s children.180 But this justification is unsatisfying both be-
cause it is circular (it assumes, without requiring any kind of 
prima facie showing, that the defendant actually did commit a 
crime against his wife) and because it does not explain those cases 
in which the victim-spouse, who is not alleged to have done any-
thing wrong, is compelled to forfeit her own spousal privilege by 
being made to testify against her husband. 
Other judges justify this breach of privilege by reasoning that 
the act of committing a crime against one’s spouse vitiates mari-
tal privilege entirely because it destroys “the deep bond of trust 
and love between marital partners and disrupts family harmony,” 
the very features of marriage that the privilege was designed to 
protect.181 This explanation solves the victim-spouse problem—
marital privilege is destroyed altogether, because the defendant-
spouse has irreparably harmed the couple’s marital interests—
but not the circularity problem. 
The most cogent justification offered by judges—an explana-
tion that solves both the victim-spouse problem and the circular-
ity problem—is a pragmatic one: marital privilege must be for-
feited when one spouse is prosecuted or sued for harming the 
other, because if it were not then many intramarital crimes or 
 
 177 See note 175. 
 178 See Johnson, Note, 39 Tex L Rev at 510–12 (cited in note 175) (collecting cases). 
 179 See Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore § 6.13.5(a) at 1230 (cited in note 130) (noting 
that the “necessity exception” label is not the only moniker for the exception, and that 
courts have not always explicitly acknowledged it as a formal exception). 
 180 United States v Bahe, 128 F3d 1440, 1445, 1446 (10th Cir 1997). 
 181 United States v Breton, 740 F3d 1, 11 (1st Cir 2014). See also Bahe, 128 F3d at 
1446 (“It would be unconscionable to permit a privilege grounded on promoting communi-
cations of trust and love between marriage partners to prevent a properly outraged spouse 
with knowledge from testifying against the perpetrator of such a crime.”). 
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torts could not be litigated at all.182 It is this rationale that gives 
the necessity doctrine its name.183 It could be objected that if priv-
ilege can be overcome whenever the plaintiff’s case cannot suc-
ceed without accessing the privileged materials, then privilege 
does not exist in any meaningful sense. This argument misses the 
point: courts breach privilege in necessity cases not because any 
single, individual case depends on it, but because an entire class 
of cases—for example, spousal domestic violence cases—depends 
on it. These cases, as a class, would systematically suffer from 
(often fatal) evidentiary deficiencies if courts left spousal privilege 
intact. It is this feature—the unprosecutability of an entire set of 
cases, defined at a high level of generality—that gives meaningful 
content to the necessity doctrine. 
The necessity doctrine is not limited to spousal privilege. A 
similar doctrine and justification have also emerged in the context 
of attorney-client privilege. Even though attorney-client privilege 
is the oldest and most carefully guarded evidentiary privilege,184 it 
can be pierced for pragmatic reasons in limited circumstances. For 
example, courts allow the privilege to be breached in cases in 
which the services of a lawyer were obtained jointly on behalf of 
several clients and litigation later arises between those same cli-
ents (as often happens when one defendant realizes, in the course 
of jointly consulting an attorney, that his codefendants’ actions in-
jured him as well as the plaintiff).185 Although judges and academ-
ics have not described the joint-client exception to attorney-client 
 
 182 See, for example, Breton, 740 F3d at 11 (recognizing an exception to marital priv-
ilege in cases in which one spouse harms the couple’s children because “child abuse occurs 
most often in the home at the hands of a parent” and absent such an exception it would be 
too difficult to prosecute child abuse cases as a class); Johnson v United States, 616 A2d 
1216, 1222 (DC 1992) (explaining that, absent the necessity exception, the defendant-
spouse would have “complete immunity” from prosecution so long as he or she engaged in 
the abuse “in secret”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 183 See Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore § 6.13.5 at 1230 (cited in note 130). 
 184 Upjohn, 449 US at 389. 
 185 See Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore § 6.13.2(b) at 1157–60 (cited in note 130) 
(explaining the scope of the joint-client exception and collecting cases). Attorney-client 
privilege also does not apply in cases in which a client sues her attorney for malpractice, 
id § 6.13.2(a) at 1142, but malpractice suits are an example of waiving a privilege (because 
the privilege belongs to the client who is electing to bring suit), not a genuine exception to 
privilege. Suits between coclients involve a genuine exception to privilege, rather than a 
waiver, because a defendant-client’s privilege is breached in these suits even when the 
defendant-client does not want the lawsuit to continue, and even when there is no prima 
facie evidence that the defendant-client engaged in any wrongdoing. See id § 6.13.2(b) at 
1157–60. Another example of a genuine exception to attorney-client privilege occurs in 
wrongful-discharge suits brought by an in-house attorney against her former employer-
client. Several courts have recognized something like a “necessity exception” in this class 
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privilege as an example of the “necessity” doctrine,186 it serves the 
same role and has similar justifications.187 Namely, the joint-client 
exception allows discovery of otherwise-privileged communica-
tions in a certain class of cases (suits between coclients, in their 
capacity as coclients) that would, in the absence of such an excep-
tion, often be impossible to litigate. 
2. Applying the necessity doctrine in the reverse-payment 
context. 
The same reasoning that justifies necessity exceptions to 
attorney-client privilege and to marital privilege applies with 
equal force to settlement privilege. As Skelaxin illustrates—and 
as the judge in that case observed188—upholding settlement priv-
ilege in reverse-payment suits creates systematic evidentiary de-
ficiencies in this class of cases. Consequently, just as the necessity 
doctrine allows courts to breach spousal privilege when one 
spouse commits a crime against the other, and to breach attorney-
client privilege when one coclient sues another, the necessity doc-
trine likely also allows courts to breach settlement privilege when 
the settlement itself is the subject of civil litigation or a criminal 
prosecution. 
One possible formulation of the necessity limitation, as ap-
plied to settlement privilege, runs as follows: in order to invoke 
necessity in the settlement-privilege context, the plaintiff’s claim 
must necessarily challenge the legality or validity of settlement 
terms to which the defendant was a party. This formulation covers 
a small but important handful of cases, such as reverse-payment 
suits, in which the plaintiff is required to prove the illegality of a 
settlement in order to prevail. It would also include traditional 
 
of cases, reasoning that without an exception, wrongful-discharge suits would be difficult 
or impossible to litigate. See id § 6.13.2(a) at 1143 n 40 (collecting cases). 
 186 See Wright and Graham, 24 Federal Practice and Procedure § 5505 at 549 (cited 
in note 145) (explaining that this exception is often “justified by the intent of the joint 
parties who are supposed to have intended confidentiality as against others but not be-
tween themselves,” but that others criticize this justification as “fictional and beside the 
point” because it is not accurate in many cases and because admitting the communications 
into the record of a court case makes the privileged communications available to the world, 
not just to the coclients). 
 187 See id. 
 188 See Skelaxin Order at *3, 5 (cited in note 79) (noting that settlement documents 
are likely to be “highly probative of [defendants’] liability” in reverse-payment cases and 
that successful invocation of settlement privilege in reverse-payment cases would neces-
sarily “deprive plaintiffs of valuable evidence”). 
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breach-of-settlement contract disputes.189 But under this formu-
lation, settlement privilege could not be breached in lawsuits that 
do not necessarily challenge the legality or meaning of settlement 
terms—such as tort suits, prejudice hearings, or third-party liti-
gation190—which are precisely the kinds of situations the settle-
ment privilege was designed to cover.191 
Although evaluating the general policy merits of federal set-
tlement privilege is beyond the scope of this Comment,192 a settle-
ment privilege with a necessity exception is far more conducive 
to sound public policy—as defined by the Supreme Court’s four-
factor Jaffee test—than a settlement privilege without such an 
exception. First, the necessity exception allows discovery only in 
a small handful of cases, and these are not the cases in which 
parties’ “need for confidence and trust”193 is greatest.194 Parties 
need confidence and trust when negotiating a settlement because 
of the risk that their adversary or “some future third party” could 
 
 189 For an example of such a case, consider the following hypothetical. Dave and Paul, 
divorcing spouses, enter into a settlement agreement according to which “Paul retains 
possession of the couple’s physical assets, except that Dave must transfer title of all jointly 
owned motor vehicles to Paul.” Following the divorce, Dave retains possession of the cou-
ple’s jointly owned motorboat. Paul sues Dave for breach of contract, arguing that the 
settlement’s reference to “motor vehicles” includes the couple’s motorboat. Suppose that 
parol evidence located in Dave and Paul’s settlement communications vindicates Paul’s 
interpretation. Under the crime-fraud doctrine, Paul could not enter these presettlement 
documents into the court record, because the documents were not drafted in furtherance 
of a crime or fraud. However, if the court construed the settlement privilege as inapplica-
ble in situations in which the settlement itself is at issue, the court would allow Paul access 
to the settlement communications because the underlying suit concerns the terms of the 
settlement contract. 
 190 Used in this context, “third-party litigation” describes lawsuits to which none of 
the settlement signers is a party. For example, many patent infringement suits require 
courts to estimate reasonable licensing fees for the patent. Settlement licensing agree-
ments entered into by other parties (but for similar patents) can indicate whether a specific 
licensing fee is reasonable or not. For an example, see In re MSTG, 675 F3d at 1339–41. 
 191 See Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980 (justifying the Sixth Circuit’s recognition of settle-
ment privilege by explaining that “[p]arties are unlikely to propose the types of compro-
mises that most effectively lead to settlement unless they are confident that their proposed 
solutions cannot be used on cross examination, under the ruse of ‘impeachment evidence,’ 
by some future third party”) (emphasis added). See also text accompanying notes 105–10. 
 192 For a broad evaluation of the jurisprudential and policy goals served by settlement 
privilege, see generally Andrew Sher, FRCP 26 vs. FRE 408: Why Settlement Negotiations 
Should Be Privileged against Third-Party Discovery, 16 Cardozo J Conflict Resol 295 
(2014) (arguing that courts should recognize a settlement negotiation privilege to reduce 
administrative costs and that the Jaffee factors weigh in favor of recognizing such a priv-
ilege); Lauderdale, 35 U Memphis L Rev 255 (cited in note 91) (concluding that the Sixth 
Circuit’s creation of a federal settlement privilege represents smart public policy in addi-
tion to being proper under FRE 501). 
 193 Jaffee, 518 US at 10. 
 194 See text accompanying notes 105–10. See also notes 190–91 and accompanying text. 
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admit settlement communications “on cross examination, under 
the ruse of ‘impeachment evidence,’” when the actual purpose and 
effect of such an admission would be to prejudice the fact finder 
against the settling party.195 The risk that settlement documents 
will unduly prejudice a judge or jury is high in suits that center 
on factual allegations similar to the allegations that inspired the 
settlement negotiations.196 But there is little risk of undue preju-
dice—which, by definition, implicates concerns that are ancillary 
to the facts or issues of a case197—when the direct object of the suit 
is the settlement itself. 
Second, the inclusion of the necessity exception significantly 
expands the public policy interests served by the settlement priv-
ilege. Without a necessity exception, courts would be unable to 
make appropriately informed judgments in an entire class of 
cases—reverse-payment cases—that the Supreme Court has 
judged to have great social and economic significance.198 Nor 
would courts be able to adjudicate ordinary breach-of-contract 
cases that arise from disputes regarding ambiguous contractual 
language within a settlement.199 On the other hand, recognition 
of a necessity exception allows courts to avoid these problematic 
results without compromising the public policy aims that settle-
ment privilege was designed to protect. 
Third, and relatedly, the existence of a necessity exception for 
settlement privilege minimizes the evidentiary detriment caused 
by the privilege.200 Fourth, adopting the necessity doctrine for set-
tlement privilege brings federal law into more, rather than less, 
 
 195 Goodyear, 332 F3d at 980. 
 196 Product liability actions are a classic example of suits in which this risk is espe-
cially high. See text accompanying notes 109–10. 
 197 Black’s Law Dictionary 1370 (West 10th ed 2014) (describing undue prejudice as 
the “harm resulting from a fact-trier’s being exposed to evidence that . . . so arouses the 
emotions that calm and logical reasoning is abandoned”). 
 198 See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2227–30 (describing the millions of dollars in profits and 
consumer welfare at stake in these cases). It could be argued that recognizing a necessity 
exception contravenes sound public policy because doing so gives parties an incentive to 
misrepresent their intentions in settlement discussions, thereby “planting” evidence that 
distracts or misleads courts. To the extent that such an incentive exists, however, it oper-
ates with just as much force in a world without a necessity exception. Because parties can 
waive settlement privilege, parties could manufacture innocent reasons for settling, incor-
porate those reasons into their settlement communications, and then admit those manu-
factured communications by waiving their privilege. 
 199 See note 189 and accompanying text. 
 200 For a discussion of the kinds of evidence allowed by the necessity doctrine that 
would otherwise be privileged, see Part III.B.1. 
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conformity with state law. Most states protect settlement com-
munications in some form, but no states shield settlement dis-
cussions from discovery or admissibility in cases in which the 
settlement itself is challenged.201 
For these reasons, a necessity exception to settlement privi-
lege strengthens the evidentiary and antitrust jurisprudence of 
those courts that currently recognize such a privilege. It also 
makes implementation of settlement privilege more feasible for 
those courts that have not yet decided whether to recognize set-
tlement privilege. 
* * * 
Despite the superficial similarities between the necessity ex-
ception and the crime-fraud limitation, the necessity doctrine has 
a different rationale and produces different results than the 
crime-fraud limitation. Specifically, the crime-fraud limitation al-
lows discovery only when the moving party makes out a prima 
facie case that both parties undertook the settlement communi-
cations in furtherance of a criminal or fraudulent act. It does not 
allow discovery in ordinary breach-of-contract or other civil dis-
putes centered on a settlement agreement. Nor does it allow dis-
covery in reverse-payment cases in which the plaintiff cannot 
gather enough nonprivileged evidence to make out a prima facie 
showing of crime or fraud, or in which the plaintiff can do this only 
with respect to one party, rather than both. The necessity excep-
tion, in contrast, applies across the board; it does not require courts 
or litigants to make the costly, difficult, and time-consuming deter-
minations necessary to invoke the crime-fraud limitation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eastern District of Tennessee suggested in Skelaxin that 
federal settlement privilege appears to be fundamentally incom-
patible with the Supreme Court’s reverse-payment jurisprudence. 
At first blush, this conclusion seems unavoidable. Actavis in-
structs courts to examine the motivations behind reverse-payment 
settlements, and settlement privilege shields from discovery the 
most valuable evidence of parties’ motivations. But such a result 
is not inevitable. Specifically, litigants in reverse-payment cases 
may invoke the crime-fraud doctrine or, more promisingly, the 
 
 201 See In re MSTG, 675 F3d at 1343 (observing that no state legislature has enacted 
settlement privilege). 
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necessity exception, to uncover otherwise-privileged settlement 
communications in reverse-payment cases. This result allows 
those courts that have recognized a federal settlement privilege 
to fully retain that privilege without undermining their antitrust 
jurisprudence. 
